Interesting article in Scientific American this month by a 'systems neuroscientist' on the difference between 'outside-in' concepts of perception and 'inside-out' ones. Essentially, it's about the extent to which the brain prepares models of how to interpret the signals it is receiving through eyes, ears etc. , as opposed to simply receiving inputs and inexplicably creating meaning to attach to them.
He has changed his views of this , after having taught outside-in theory for decades and realising it has always glossed over its dependence on an observer to generate meaning. Now he favours inside-out, in which thd brain develops and accumulates, over time, a body of information about the perceived object which enables it to attch meaning to it.
"the interplay of ideas towards an approximation of truth to one of multiple truths and power plays to impose dominance (the Foucaultian view)."
It is this relationship between "power plays" and "dominance" that interests me. What is "power" in "power plays"? What is meant by "dominance"? Are we talking about a correspondence theory of truth in relation to "multiples truths"?
Doug: You've written a great piece here. Two quick points to consider as this discussion moves forward.
1. The distinction between ontology and epistemology might not be that opposition. In a word, what's missing from the conversation is the issue of interpretation, or the "making sense" of what we observe (and possibly measure, and define, etc.). Reality can land on our heads, but still have to make sense of it. This is why the same observations can lead (first) to alchemy before chemistry, astrology before astronomy, etc. The scientific process is aware that it's an interpretative activity and therefore remains open to falsification of theories and hypotheses; so-called "paradigm shifts" and all the rest. That doesn't mean "everything is constructed." Rather, it means that interpretation is always a factor in the creation of meaning. We need to come to terms with this if we're to reconcile the plurality of understandings in the world with the fact of empirical reality.
2. Those of us (and I include myself) who do accept a constructivist approach to understanding how people REACH those premises, practices, and meanings that animate and organize their lives don't form a monolithic group. I studied national security and then IR and security (and then worked 10 years with the UN) because I wanted to understand and later influence how we build strategies to deal with (peacefully when possible, violently if necessary) those who commit genocide and otherwise make life miserable for everyone. They DO see reality differently. So … we need to know how they make sense of the world so we engage that. I consider this empirical and demonstrable and falsifiable (i.e. the Nazis DID look at the world as X and acted accordingly so … we needed to "get that", not agree with it).
In the final analysis, we need to recognize that people think differently, those differences are influential, and we're going to need to expand our vocabulary and use it correctly we we talk about (in my view) empirical reality; rights (in law, and which confer obligations); and liberties (which are NOT ensconced in law, but are negotiated in good will to balance the preferences of people while doing no harm, ideally).
Interesting article in Scientific American this month by a 'systems neuroscientist' on the difference between 'outside-in' concepts of perception and 'inside-out' ones. Essentially, it's about the extent to which the brain prepares models of how to interpret the signals it is receiving through eyes, ears etc. , as opposed to simply receiving inputs and inexplicably creating meaning to attach to them.
He has changed his views of this , after having taught outside-in theory for decades and realising it has always glossed over its dependence on an observer to generate meaning. Now he favours inside-out, in which thd brain develops and accumulates, over time, a body of information about the perceived object which enables it to attch meaning to it.
Scientific American has one doctor.
"the interplay of ideas towards an approximation of truth to one of multiple truths and power plays to impose dominance (the Foucaultian view)."
It is this relationship between "power plays" and "dominance" that interests me. What is "power" in "power plays"? What is meant by "dominance"? Are we talking about a correspondence theory of truth in relation to "multiples truths"?
Doug: You've written a great piece here. Two quick points to consider as this discussion moves forward.
1. The distinction between ontology and epistemology might not be that opposition. In a word, what's missing from the conversation is the issue of interpretation, or the "making sense" of what we observe (and possibly measure, and define, etc.). Reality can land on our heads, but still have to make sense of it. This is why the same observations can lead (first) to alchemy before chemistry, astrology before astronomy, etc. The scientific process is aware that it's an interpretative activity and therefore remains open to falsification of theories and hypotheses; so-called "paradigm shifts" and all the rest. That doesn't mean "everything is constructed." Rather, it means that interpretation is always a factor in the creation of meaning. We need to come to terms with this if we're to reconcile the plurality of understandings in the world with the fact of empirical reality.
2. Those of us (and I include myself) who do accept a constructivist approach to understanding how people REACH those premises, practices, and meanings that animate and organize their lives don't form a monolithic group. I studied national security and then IR and security (and then worked 10 years with the UN) because I wanted to understand and later influence how we build strategies to deal with (peacefully when possible, violently if necessary) those who commit genocide and otherwise make life miserable for everyone. They DO see reality differently. So … we need to know how they make sense of the world so we engage that. I consider this empirical and demonstrable and falsifiable (i.e. the Nazis DID look at the world as X and acted accordingly so … we needed to "get that", not agree with it).
In the final analysis, we need to recognize that people think differently, those differences are influential, and we're going to need to expand our vocabulary and use it correctly we we talk about (in my view) empirical reality; rights (in law, and which confer obligations); and liberties (which are NOT ensconced in law, but are negotiated in good will to balance the preferences of people while doing no harm, ideally).
Onward!